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Abstract: 
 
Price dispersion of a homogeneous product reflects market efficiency and has significant 
implications on sellers’ pricing strategies. Two different perspectives, the supply and demand 
perspectives, can be adopted to examine this phenomenon. The former focuses on listing prices 
posted by sellers, and the latter uses transaction prices that consumers pay to obtain the product. 
However, no prior research has systematically compared both perspectives, and it is unclear 
whether different perspectives will generate different insights. Using a unique data set collected 
from an online market, we find that the dispersion of listing prices is three times higher than the 
dispersion of transaction prices. More interestingly, the drivers of price dispersion differ 
significantly between listing and transaction data. The dispersion of listing prices reflects sellers’ 
perception of market environment and their pricing strategies, and it may not fully capture 
consumer behavior manifested through the variation of transaction prices. Our study indicates 
that the difference in perspectives taken on the online prices yields different results as to their 
dispersion. 
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Article: 
 
Classical microeconomic theory predicts the “law of one price” for homogeneous goods in 
friction-free markets, where firm competition is perfect and consumer search cost is zero. 
However, extensive empirical studies in the past several decades have challenged the existence 
of friction-free markets and the “law of one price.” It has been found that price dispersion is 
ubiquitous and persistent across various homogeneous product markets, such as books, gasoline, 
automobiles, consumer electronics, and airlines [4, 7, 12, 16, 20, 43, 57]. Price dispersion stems 
from many factors, including seller heterogeneity (e.g., varying service qualities, reputation), 
consumer heterogeneity (e.g., brand loyalty), search costs, market structure, and bounded 
rationality [2, 5, 11, 12, 37, 43]. Even in electronic markets where information transparency is 
largely improved and search costs are significantly reduced, the dispersion of prices for a 
homogeneous product is still a common phenomenon [27, 28, 51, 57, 60]. 
 
Extensive literature has examined price dispersion theoretically and empirically in order to gain 
insights into market conditions resulting in potential price discrimination strategies [4, 10]. Two 
different perspectives, the supply and demand perspectives, have been used to examine this 
phenomenon [28]. The former focuses on listing prices posted by the sellers, and the latter uses 
transaction prices that consumers pay to obtain the product. However, very limited research has 
adopted both perspectives in one study, so it is unclear whether these two perspectives will 
generate consistent insights. In other words, does the dispersion of listing prices differ from that 
of transaction prices and how? 
 
In an efficient market with fully informed consumers and rational sellers, both listing and 
transaction prices will converge to the marginal cost of the product [8, 10]. Thus, there is no need 
to differentiate between the supply and demand perspectives. However, markets are rarely 
completely efficient, and the variation of listing prices is not always the same as the variation of 
transaction prices. For example, buyers and sellers often have asymmetric information [47, 69], 
or they may be bounded rational. When setting their prices, some sellers may not have rational 
expectation of consumers’ willingness to pay, and thus a proportion of listing prices may never 
be realized eventually because they are not competitive in the market. Anecdotal evidence also 
indicates that the dispersion of transactions prices differs from the dispersion of listing prices. 
Ghose and Yao [27] find that the difference between listing prices of a pencil sharpener can be as 
great as $12.19, whereas its transaction prices differ only a few cents in their data set. Similarly, 
in our case, the listing prices for the Coach handbag style Kristin Leather Cross-body, range 
from ¥780 to ¥1,667 in an online microbusiness market, but its transaction prices range only 
from ¥898 to ¥988. 
 
Due to these potential differences, it is important to investigate and compare the dispersion of 
listing prices and the dispersion of transaction prices in order to obtain a complete picture of the 
market. The dispersion of listing prices reflects sellers’ pricing strategies when facing 
competition in the market, whereas the dispersion of transaction prices characterizes consumers’ 
reaction to alternative offerings in the market [51]. In addition, exploring the differences can 
shed light on information asymmetry and interactions between the supply and demand sides in a 
market [26, 49]. 
 
Prior studies have not closely investigated the differences between the dispersion of listing prices 
and the dispersion of transaction prices. Theoretical work typically focuses on the equilibrium 
price or market clearing price where the quantity supplied equals the quantity demanded [6, 7]. 
Meanwhile, most empirical research largely employs listing prices to explore price dispersion 
[16, 39, 51, 64], primarily because the listing price data are relatively easier to acquire than the 
transaction price data. Two recent studies use transaction prices to understand price dispersion in 
online markets [13, 27], but neither of them has offered a one-to-one comparison of listing and 
transaction prices. Ghose and Yao [27] find that the dispersion of transaction prices in the online 
Federal Supply Service (FSS) market designed for U.S. government procurement can be as low 
as 0.22 percent, suggesting that the “law of one price” is possible. Price dispersion in Ghose and 
Yao [27] is substantially lower than that reported in prior literature. However, unlike our study, 
they do not have listing price data in the same market. Thus it is unclear whether such a low 
price dispersion level stems from using transaction prices alone or from features specific to the 
FSS market. The study by Chellappa, Sin, and Siddarth [13] is among the first to compare listing 
prices with transaction prices in the domestic U.S. airline market. In contrast to Ghose and Yao 
[27], they find that transaction prices are more dispersed than listing prices. However, their 
comparison is not conclusive because the records in their transaction prices data set do not 
perfectly match those in their listing prices data set. Specifically, their listing prices data set 
comes purely from the online market, while the transaction prices data set mixes both online and 
offline transactions. It is well known that consumer behavior can vary significantly across online 
and offline channels [19]. In addition, a few explanatory variables are only available in the 
listing prices data set, and as a result the impacts of these variables on the dispersion of 
transaction prices cannot be fully investigated. Our study differs from Chellappa, Sin, and 
Siddarth [13], in that our data set includes both listing and transaction prices for homogeneous 
goods from the same online market, and we compare the impacts of the same set of antecedents 
of price dispersion. 
 
Our study contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, as one of the first studies to 
systematically compare the levels of price dispersion between the supply and demand 
perspectives, our research provides quantitative evidence that listing prices are more dispersed 
than transaction prices. Specifically, in our research context, the dispersion of listing prices is 
three times higher than the dispersion of transaction prices. Second, we propose and empirically 
validate that the drivers of price dispersion also differ between the two sides of the market. 
Sellers’ perception and reaction to the market environment determine the dispersion of listing 
prices, whereas consumer search preferences and shopping behavior drive the variation of 
transaction prices [45]. Our results demonstrate interesting asymmetries in the market. It is likely 
that some sellers do not fully understand consumers’ behavior, or they choose satisficing rather 
than optimal pricing strategies. Consequently, sellers’ pricing heterogeneity does not perfectly 
reflect consumers’ purchase decision heterogeneity. Our study raises the caution that the extent 
of price dispersion and the relationship between economic primitives and price dispersion 
depend on the perspective taken in individual studies. Third, we also expand the scope of product 
categories examined in price dispersion research. Prior studies focus mainly on product 
categories such as airline tickets, books, CDs, and electronics [16, 27, 39, 48, 57]. We study 
luxury goods, a category that has not been examined in depth in prior literature. Price dispersion 
research is context dependent; as Baye, Morgan, and Scholten indicate, “there is not a one-size-
fits-all model of equilibrium price dispersion” [7, p. 359]. Prior studies often differ in their 
findings on how various drivers influence price dispersion, and the applicability of those findings 
is subject to different market environments [16, 48]. Thus, extending empirical examination of 
price dispersion into a new setting, the luxury goods traded in an online market, may be 
particularly valuable. 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
The literature on economics, marketing, and information systems (IS) has examined various 
factors leading to the dispersion of prices in both offline and online markets. In general, drivers 
of price dispersion come from three levels—market, retailer, and product [10, 51, 66]. Our model 
includes all key market characteristics summarized by Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar: “item price 
level, number of competitors in market, product popularity in market” [51, p. 128]. We also 
consider retailer heterogeneity and product characteristics. 
 
To answer our research question, we first examine whether the level of price dispersion differs 
between the supply and demand sides of the market. Then to better understand the difference 
between listing and transaction prices, we explore whether the key drivers of price dispersion 
and their impacts vary between the two sides of the market. 
 
The Dispersion of Listing Prices versus the Dispersion of Transaction Prices 
 
We study an online market where multiple sellers offer a homogeneous product. These sellers 
differ in terms of popularity and reputation established in the market [10]. They are owner-
managers of microbusinesses, who are bounded rational and tend to rely on informal information 
to make satisfying rather than profit-maximizing decisions [29]. As a result, for a given product, 
we have observed considerable variation among listing prices offered by these sellers. 
 
Similar to Ghose and Yao [27], we hypothesize that the dispersion of transaction prices is lower 
than the dispersion of listing prices in such an online market. A transaction price occurs when a 
buyer agrees to buy a product from a particular seller. The process of matching buyers and 
sellers indicates that transaction prices usually represent only a subset of listing prices. In 
particular, due to the existence of less expensive alternatives, buyers are less likely to buy at 
listing prices at the high end. In addition, listing prices at the low end may look suspicious or not 
be honored (i.e., sellers’ bait-and-switch tricks) [51]. Therefore, we expect that the dispersion of 
listing prices serves as “an upper bound” on the dispersion of transaction prices [27, p. 2]. 
Hypothesis 1: 
The dispersion of transaction prices is lower than the dispersion of listing prices. 
 
The Price Level 
 
Product price levels have long been considered an important source of price dispersion [10], and 
Stigler [61] suggests that expensive items would have lower price dispersion than cheap items. 
According to the search-theoretic models of price dispersion, varying search costs encountered 
by consumers split up the market and lead to price discrimination [54]. More search activities 
may reduce information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, leave fewer uninformed 
consumers in the market, and result in less price fluctuation. The extent of information search 
engaged by consumers is determined by both their ability to search and their motivation to search 
[55]. For more expensive products, consumers are motivated to conduct more intensive search. 
Price can be viewed as a proxy of consumer involvement [50], and the enduring involvement and 
shopping enthusiasm associated with more expensive products encourage consumers to increase 
their information search activities [55]. In addition, consumers are more cautious toward items 
that account for a larger share of their budgets, and they pursue higher potential savings from 
these expensive items [40, 52, 71]. Increased search from highly involved consumers can 
pressure sellers to be vigilant and set prices toward a competitive level. Some empirical evidence 
confirms this conjecture. For instance, Stigler [61] finds that the expensive product, automobiles, 
has lower price dispersion than the less expensive product, anthracite coal. In another study, 
Eckard [24] traces price dispersion for staple products from 1901 to 2001. He finds that price 
dispersion increases over time as the proportion of household budgets that these products 
account for decreases from 1901 to 2001. Therefore, we hypothesize: Hypothesis 2a: 
The level of price dispersion is negatively associated with the price level of a product. 
 
More intensive search associated with a more expensive product is expected to reduce its price 
dispersion, and this effect may be stronger on the demand side than on the supply side. Buyers, 
rather than sellers, directly face costs in searching information prior to purchase. Compared with 
sellers, buyers have stronger incentives to engage in intensive search activities in order to reduce 
prices that they pay in a transaction. Buyers rely on others’ transaction records to justify their 
own purchase, leading to converging transaction prices. On the supply side, classic economic 
theory predicts that increased search activities intensify competition and lower margins for 
sellers [42]. However, in online markets where the majority sellers are owner-managers of 
microbusinesses, sellers are often bounded rational or perform satisficing instead of profit-
maximizing behavior [30]. Some sellers possibly do not recognize that buyers would search 
more for more expensive products. Furthermore, cost components, such as sourcing costs and 
inventory costs, can be different among sellers. Bounded rationality and varying costs may limit 
some sellers’ ability to offer more converging prices for more expensive products. So we 
propose the following hypothesis: Hypothesis 2b: 
The negative impact of the price level on price dispersion is stronger for transaction prices than 
for listing prices. 
 
The Number of Competitors 
 
The extent of price dispersion also depends on the competitive environment, which can be 
measured by the number of sellers or competitors offering a homogeneous good in the same 
market. Interestingly, the theoretical prediction and empirical evidence of the relationship 
between the number of sellers and price dispersion are mixed [5]—Cohen [18] concludes that the 
number of competitors is a “double-edged sword” in a market function. 
 
Based on prior literature, we summarize there are two effects that can potentially influence the 
relationship between the number of sellers and the extent of price dispersion. The first effect is 
the competition effect, which suggests that the dispersion of prices drops with increased 
competition. Classic economic theory suggests that market competition will be intensified when 
there are more sellers offering the same product [62]. In a competitive market, consumers have 
multiple choices of a product, and sellers are pressed to set their prices competitively in order to 
compete with other sellers. Thus, more densely populated markets may demonstrate less price 
dispersion. For instance, Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck [5] find that less price dispersion is 
associated with a higher number of gasoline stations in the same geographical area. Pan, 
Ratchford, and Shankar [50] show that the number of competitors is negatively associated with 
price dispersion on a price comparison website for books, CDs, DVDs, computer software and 
hardware, and also consumer electronics. 
 
The second effect is the search cost effect—increasing the number of sellers can boost price 
dispersion due to higher search costs [6, 61]. Consumers incur a higher search cost when there 
are more sellers in the market. They may be information-overloaded or confused with a larger 
number of alternatives. Although search costs have been reduced significantly in online markets, 
they have not been completely eliminated yet [56]. For instance, the lowest price can be easily 
identified via various search tools provided by online markets, but price is not the only attribute 
that consumers care about [71]. Many buyers still delve deeply into individual sellers’ profiles 
and their prior transaction records in order to compare and select the seller from whom they are 
willing to purchase the product. Intensive search is particularly important in the context of online 
microbusiness markets, where sellers are unbranded and unknown to consumers. Empirically, 
data from the U.S. airline industry suggest a positive relationship between price dispersion and 
the number of competitors. Several studies show that prices are more dispersed when market 
concentration, which is measured by the number of airlines offering services on the same route, 
increases [9, 13]. However, conflicting results also exist in the same airline industry. Martin and 
Koo [44] find that the competition intensity does not significantly affect the variation of the 
airfares over time. Such mixed findings suggest that the relationship between the number of 
competitors and price dispersion is complicated and warrants further exploration. 
 
We suggest that the competition effect is more relevant to sellers, whereas the search cost effect 
is more applicable to buyers. Sellers directly face market competitive pressures. Compared with 
buyers, they are more sensitive to the existence and actions of competing sellers. When there are 
more competitors, sellers will find it more difficult to maintain a price that is higher than that of 
other sellers [5]. By contrast, buyers, rather than sellers, directly bear search costs in the 
shopping process. When the number of sellers in the market increases, some consumers may not 
have enough capacity to exhaustively search all alternative offerings. The result is that some 
consumers are less informed and likely to choose a seller whose price is not among the lowest in 
the market [11]. Therefore, we hypothesize: Hypothesis 3a: 
The number of competitors is negatively associated with the dispersion of listing prices. 
Hypothesis 3b: 
The number of competitors is positively associated with the dispersion of transaction 
prices. 
 
Seller Reputation Heterogeneity 
 
Seller heterogeneity is a key driver of price variation of homogeneous products. The reason is 
that sellers can profit by charging a price premium via differentiated service offerings, privacy 
protection, and trust signaling [12, 16, 20, 37, 43, 54]. In online markets, consumers potentially 
face higher transaction risks, such as scamming and fraudulent business transactions, than they 
do in face-to-face transactions [49]. It is difficult to verify the authenticity or quality of the listed 
products prior to online purchases. To reduce such risks, consumers evaluate the trustworthiness 
of the sellers in order to ensure a satisfying shopping experience [14, 50]. Typically, sellers have 
various strategies to signal their trustworthiness, including improving brand awareness, 
advertising, and building a reputation [4, 12]. In our research context, sellers are microbusiness 
owners who have rarely established well-known names, and they often face low consumer 
awareness and loyalty due to lack of branding. They also do not have much advertising budget to 
signal their trustworthiness. Therefore, reputation building is an important viable strategy used 
by sellers to manifest trust [10]. The seller reputation mechanism is also important in the context 
of shopping for luxury goods in an online market. Average consumers rarely buy luxury products 
repetitively or frequently, so most of them have limited transaction history or personal 
experience in interacting with the sellers. Consumers thus heavily rely on sellers’ reputation to 
make their purchase decisions. Therefore, we focus on seller reputation heterogeneity in this 
research. 
 
The marketing literature suggests that reputation impacts consumers’ price perceptions [21]. 
Consumers are willing to pay price premiums for trustworthy sellers in order to minimize 
potential exchange risks [50]. As a result, sellers’ reputation becomes their competitive 
advantage and enables them to price higher in the market. Reputation building also has the 
property of network externalities, as “more customers create a stronger signal of trust and strong 
signals of trust may lead to more customers” [10, p. 579]. Reputable sellers may not only enjoy 
price premiums from higher trustworthiness perceived by consumers but also benefit from a 
larger potential market size. Therefore, the larger the differences among sellers’ reputation, the 
greater price dispersion is, and we hypothesize: Hypothesis 4a: 
Heterogeneity in sellers’ reputation is positively associated with the level of price 
dispersion. 
 
Seller reputation, as a viable tool for differentiation in an online market, can be a source of price 
premiums and a cause of price dispersion. However, we expect that the impact of seller 
reputation heterogeneity on price dispersion will be weaker for transaction prices than for listing 
prices. On one hand, less reputable sellers may suffer from the loss aversion effect [36]. Loss 
aversion describes people’s tendency to strongly prefer the avoidance of losses to the acquisition 
of gains. In our context, buyers are highly involved and are not attached to the brand of sellers, 
and are thus more influenced by negative information than by equally extreme positive 
information [1]. These buyers might avoid conducting potentially risky transactions with less 
reputable sellers, even though the latter charge lower listing prices. On the other hand, highly 
reputable sellers may face consumers’ diminishing marginal utility of reputation [46]. Studies 
show that sellers receive little or no reward after their reputation goes beyond a certain threshold 
[41], and high listing prices offered by highly reputable sellers can be unattractive to potential 
buyers. Consequently, listing price variation caused by reputation heterogeneity among sellers 
may not manifest on the demand side due to unrealized transactions. This leads to our following 
hypothesis: Hypothesis 4b: 
The positive impact of seller reputation heterogeneity on price dispersion is weaker for 
transaction prices than for listing prices. 
 
Empirical Context, Data, and Descriptive Analyses 
 
Product Selection 
 
We chose luxury handbags as the focal product category in this study for several reasons. First, 
the luxury good market is an important but understudied economic sector. It has experienced 
spectacular growth since the 1980s as middle-market consumers have traded up [59], but related 
research is still limited compared with nonluxury counterparts [23, 67]. Specifically, luxury 
goods have not been systematically investigated in price dispersion research. Prior studies on 
price dispersion have examined product categories such as books, office supplies, electronics, 
and airfares [e.g., 13, 16, 27]. However, findings of price dispersion studies are often sensitive to 
product types [68]. Thus, exploring luxury handbags can help us to gain additional insights. 
Second, branded handbags ensure standardization. No matter how individual sellers in online 
markets source their luxury designer handbags, the products are originally distributed by the 
same brand owners and are of the same quality. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume product 
homogeneity in our research context. Third, luxury handbags are high-involvement products. 
Luxury goods satisfy not only consumers’ utilitarian performance but also their sensory pleasure 
and social status signaling [67]. The combination of luxury goods and expensive prices causes 
consumers to be highly involved in the shopping process of luxury goods, and consumer 
involvement matters in the mechanisms causing price dispersion [17]. Last but not least, some 
general confusion exists between the supply and demand sides of the luxury good market [67]. It 
is thus desirable for us to study the differences in price dispersion between the two sides of the 
luxury good market. 
 
We examine the luxury good market in China, which is predicted to account for about 20 percent 
of global luxury sales in 2015 [3]. We selected both the most prestigious luxury brand, Louis 
Vuitton (LV), and the “affordable luxury” brand, Coach. LV is often top ranked among the most 
powerful luxury brands whereas Coach is renowned for introducing the “accessible luxury” to 
the masses [32]. Both LV and Coach are popular luxury brands among Asian consumers [31, 
38]. LV products were reported as the most desired brands in China in 2011, according to 
research by Bain and Co. [70]. And Coach was the third best-selling brand in the Chinese market 
with a turnover of $300 million in the first half of 2012 and annualized sales growth of 60 
percent [53]. Including both brands increases the external generalizability of our results. 
 
The Electronic Market 
 
We collected data from Taobao Marketplace, the largest Internet retail and trading website in 
China. It services more than 800 million product listings and more than 500 million registered 
users as of June 2012. The combined gross merchandise volume of Taobao Marketplace and 
Tmall.com exceeded RMB1 trillion, accounting for approximately 90 percent of China’s e-
commerce market (http://news.alibaba.com/specials/aboutalibaba/aligroup/index.html).1 Taobao 
Marketplace provides microbusiness owners with a platform to run online retail stores and post 
their products for sale. Taobao Marketplace has a number of sellers listing luxury designer 
handbags such as LV and Coach. For a specific luxury handbag style, the number of sellers 
ranges from a couple to more than 100. In addition to typical listing information, Taobao also 
posts the transaction records for a listed product in the past thirty days. The rich information 
available on Taobao.com enables us to investigate both the listing and transaction activities in 
the same online market. 
 
Data Collection 
 
Our data collection includes two steps. First, we collected the Coach and LV handbag 
information, such as style number, official price, size, material (leather/no leather), and being a 
new arrival or not, from the official websites (http://www.coach.com and 
http://www.louisvuitton.fr). The data collection from the official channels was conducted twice, 
first in April 2011 and then in September 2011, so that new products released for the fall/winter 
collection were incorporated. The second step of data collection was performed once per week 
from May 30, 2011, to January 23, 2012 (about thirty-four weeks). We developed a web-based 
spider using multiple languages such as python, wget, and perl to automatically retrieve all 
listing pages of LV and Coach handbags in the Taobao Marketplace based on the Coach and LV 
style numbers collected from the official channels in the first step (Figures 1a and 1b).We then 
used a parser that we developed using Bash shell script to extract the listing and transaction data 
such as listing prices, numbers of listing pages being added to wish lists, seller location 
information, seller reputation scores, transaction history, and so on, from each listing page. 
 
 
 
Figure 1a. Taobao product search page 
 
 
 
Figure 1b. An example of a seller’s listing page on Taobao.com 
 
Data Description 
Our data set consists of Coach and LV handbags’ style information, and Taobao listing and 
transaction records from June 2011 to January 2012. The unit of analysis, i, is a handbag style 
(e.g., LV M41528, Speedy 25 Monogram Canvas). We study the dispersion of listing prices 
among all sellers offering the same handbag style as well as the dispersion of transaction prices 
of the same style. Because transactions are sparse (some handbag styles have no transaction in a 
given week during the data collection period), the temporal unittused in this analysis is “month.” 
 
We use seller location in the e-commerce market to control for the possibility of counterfeit 
products. The data set used in the analysis includes only overseas e-commerce sellers, whose 
locations are not listed as in Mainland China. In Taobao Marketplace, these overseas sellers 
provide DaiGou services, that is, they sell branded products purchased from overseas markets to 
consumers in China. Luxury handbags are priced higher in China than in origin countries due to 
heavy tariffs, and DaiGou sellers can arbitrage by sourcing handbags from the official channels 
in their local markets and selling them back to China via Taobao. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics for our data. 
 
TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS OMITTED FROM THIS FORMATTED 
DOCUMENT 
 
We use two widely adopted metrics, percentage difference (PD) and coefficient of variation 
(CV), to quantify price dispersion [37]. PD is calculated as the difference between the highest 
(listing) price (LP) and the lowest (transaction) price (TP), divided by the mean price for a 
handbag style across different sellers or buyers. CV is calculated as the ratio of standard 
deviation of the prices to the mean price for a handbag style across different sellers or buyers. 
Both measures allow us to compare the dispersion of one data series to another even if the means 
are different. For both listing and transaction prices data sets, we run the analysis using PD or 
CV, respectively, as the dependent variable to check the robustness of the results. We therefore 
have four dependent variables—PD of listing prices (PDLP), CV of listing prices (CVLP), PD of 
transaction prices (PDTP), and CV of transaction prices (CVTP). 
 
The variable PRICE is defined as a handbag style’s price in the origin country. It approximates 
individual sellers’ sourcing prices and is an important benchmark they use to set prices on 
Taobao. Specifically, we use Coach’s prices in the United States and LV’s prices in France in the 
analysis. The variable SELLER represents the number of sellers for a handbag style, which is 
measured by the number of listings for a handbag style in the market. On Taobao, a seller creates 
a listing page for a handbag style that s/he sells, so the number of listings approximates the 
number of sellers. The variable DISPERSIONSR represents seller reputation heterogeneity, 
which is measured by the dispersion of seller ratings. We adopted the reputation scores provided 
by Taobao. Taobao runs a feedback system that allows a buyer to rate the seller as positive, 
neutral, or negative after each transaction. Taobao assigns values, 1, 0, –1, to positive, neutral, 
and negative feedback, respectively, and calculates the rating of a seller by totaling the values of 
buyer feedback for that seller. Both PD and CV are calculated for seller ratings so in the analysis 
we keep the measures of seller reputation heterogeneity consistent with that of the dependent 
variable, that is, we use PD (or CV) of seller reputation when PD (or CV) is used for price 
dispersion. 
 
We include several variables to control product heterogeneity and relevant market features. 
Popular products, compared with niche products, tend to draw more attention from consumers 
and reinforce their own sales [25, 65]. Such high awareness among consumers can help ease 
consumers’ search efforts, leading to lower price dispersion. Therefore, we include a variable, 
POPULARITY, which is measured by the counts of a handbag style being added to consumers’ 
wish lists. If a consumer is interested in a particular handbag style from a seller, s/he can add the 
listing page to a personal wish list to trace the item later. Thus the number of a handbag style 
being added to wish lists reflects the potential market interest for it. Because the cumulative 
wish-list count of a handbag style is nondecreasing in the number of sellers, we normalize the 
wish-list count by averaging the counts by sellers. We include a BRAND variable with 1 
representing LV and 0 representing Coach. Consumers may enthuse about new arrivals and this 
can impact sellers’ pricing strategies. We therefore use a dichotomous variable, NEWARRIVAL, 
which equals 1 if the handbag is newly released and 0 otherwise. The market may shrink as time 
elapses after a handbag style is released. We control a handbag style’s age by adding a 
STYLEAGE variable, which counts the number of months that have elapsed since the handbag 
style’s data were first collected. Not all handbag styles are available in the official channels in 
China at the time of data collection. We use a dichotomous variable, AVAILABILITY, where 1 
represents that a handbag style is available and 0 otherwise. This variable applies only to the 
Coach handbag styles because all LV handbag styles are available in China. In addition to the 
seller reputation heterogeneity considered in the hypotheses, sellers also differ in other 
dimensions. In the robustness tests of this study, we include two variables, DISPERSIONST and 
DISPERSIONTQ, to control seller heterogeneity in seller tenure (ST) and transaction quantity 
(TQ). ST represents the number of days that have elapsed since a seller launched his/her store 
and TQ represents the number of handbags sold by a seller in the past month. Both PD and CV 
are calculated for ST and TQ to keep the measures of seller heterogeneity consistent with those 
of dependent variables. We also add a set of monthly time dummy variables to control the time 
effect. 
 
When there is only one observation for a handbag style, the values of PD and CV are zero and 
null, respectively. Therefore, we exclude observations for styles that had a single transaction or 
none to ensure that PD and CV have the same number of observations in the analysis of 
transaction prices [22]. Table 2 compares the dispersion of listing and transaction prices at the 
product-month level. For all luxury handbag styles examined in our research, the average PD and 
CV of the listing prices are 1.350 and 0.252, respectively. They are 0.280 and 0.105, 
respectively, for the transaction prices. Smith–Satterthwaite tests show that H1 is supported. This 
suggests that price dispersion of listing prices is significantly higher than that of transaction 
prices. In addition, our results indicate that luxury handbags’ dispersion of listing prices on 
Taobao is higher than for most products examined in prior studies, such as airline tickets and 
books [16, 27, 51]. Such a large variation of listing prices in our study can be attributed to both 
the product feature (i.e., luxury handbags being high-involvement products) as well as the 
channel features (i.e., a large number of heterogeneous sellers in the online market). 
 
 
 
Table 2. Price Dispersion at the Style-Month Level 
 
 
Table 3a. Correlation Matrix of Variables in the Listing Price Equation 
 
Econometric Model 
 
We describe the econometric model used to test the proposed hypotheses as follows. 
 
DISPERSIONit=β0+β1PRICEit+β2SELLERit+β3DISPERSIONSRit+β4POPULARITYi
t+β5BRANDi+∑αiPRODUCTi +εit 
DISPERSIONit=β0+β1PRICEit+β2SELLERit+β3DISPERSIONSRit+β4POPULARITYi
t+β5BRANDi+∑αiPRODUCTi +εit  
 
In this study, we have two types of price dispersion for a particular handbag style, one for listing 
prices and one for transaction prices. We first conduct an exploratory analysis by adding a price 
type control variable (i.e., PRICETYPE = 1 if DISPERSION represents the dispersion of listing 
prices and 0 otherwise) and pool the dispersion of listing and transaction prices together. The 
results show that price type has a significant impact on price dispersion (see Appendix, Table 
A1). In order to test our hypotheses and provide a one-to-one comparison of price dispersion 
between listing and transaction prices, we run the model for two types of prices separately. The 
coefficients α and β are parameters to be estimated. Tables 3a and 3b present the correlation 
matrix of the variables. 
 
 
 
Table 3b. Correlation Matrix of Variables in the Transaction Price Equation 
 
Statistical tests show that our panel data exhibits heteroskedasticity, and cross-sectional and 
temporal dependencies. Thus we used pooled ordinary least squares (OLS)/weighted least 
squares (WLS) and fixed effects regression models with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors [34]. 
The Driscoll–Kraay nonparametric covariance matrix estimator can produce heteroskedasticity 
consistent standard errors that are robust to very general forms of spatial and temporal 
dependence [18, 34]. This estimator is much more robust than OLS, White, Rogers, and Newey–
West estimators when the correlation of regression disturbances between handbags is present. 
This estimator is also adjusted to address the issue of unbalanced panel data insofar as some 
handbags were not observable on Taobao.com in all eight periods. The results of model 
estimation are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4. Results for Model Estimation 
 
Results 
The results indicate that the coefficients of the price level are statistically insignificant in the 
listing price equation but negative and statistically significant in the transaction price equation. 
H2a is partially supported. The t-test suggests that the coefficient of PRICE in the transaction 
equation is smaller than that of the listing equation, and H2b is also supported. The negative 
relationship between the dispersion of transaction prices and price level suggests that consumers 
in our research context are price sensitive. They tend to conduct more intensive search before 
they buy more expensive items, which leads to the convergence of transaction prices as official 
prices increase. However, on the supply side, the relationship between the dispersion of listing 
prices and the price level is statistically insignificant. The individual sellers in microbusiness 
markets have limited business analytic capability. As a result, they do not fully understand the 
consumers’ search and purchase behavior in the market. Sellers are unclear whether consumers 
will be more cautious with more expensive items, or their pricing strategies may not change 
much within a single product category. The weak connection between the consumers’ search 
behavior and the sellers’ price-setting decisions may explain why the relationship between the 
dispersion of listing prices and the price level is insignificant. 
 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients of SELLER are positive but statistically insignificant in the 
listing equation. But in the transaction equation, the coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant. H3a is not supported but H3b is supported. Luxury handbags are high-involvement 
products, which demand intensive search before purchase. In addition, sellers in the 
microbusiness market are often unbranded, which renders prepurchase search particularly 
important. Search costs significantly increase when the market is flooded with many sellers. As a 
result, consumers may end up buying from different sellers at varying prices and the dispersion 
of transaction prices is positively associated with the number of sellers. On the supply side, our 
results show that the relationship between the dispersion of listing prices and the number of 
sellers is insignificant. Compared with buyers, sellers are more aware of the existence of direct 
competitors and the intensity of price competition in the online market. The competition effect 
negates the search cost effect to some extent, which results in an insignificant relationship 
between listing price dispersion and the number of sellers. 
 
The coefficients for seller reputation heterogeneity are positive and statistically significant in the 
listing price equation but insignificant in the transaction price equation. Therefore, H4a is 
partially supported. The t-test shows that the coefficient of seller reputation heterogeneity in the 
listing price equation is larger than that of the transaction price equation, and H4b is supported. 
Good reputation helps establish trust between sellers and buyers in online markets, which 
enables sellers to charge a price premium. Therefore, the dispersion of seller ratings leads to the 
dispersion of their listing prices. However, on the demand side, consumers tend to patronize the 
sellers with reasonably good ratings to reduce transaction risks, especially for high-ticket items 
like luxury handbags. As a result, the dispersion of seller ratings does not necessarily lead to 
more dispersed transaction prices. 
 
Our results also indicate that some product-level control variables also affect price dispersion. 
The coefficients of STYLEAGE are positive and statistically significant in the listing equations 
and in one of the transaction equations. Sellers tend to adjust prices after listing a handbag for a 
while and consequently buyers purchase the handbag at different prices, leading to higher price 
dispersion [16, 35]. The coefficients of BRAND are positive and statistically significant in the 
transaction equations, suggesting that transaction prices are more dispersed for LV than for 
Coach. It is possible that consumer loyalty as well as price sensitivity to different brands differ 
[33]. To ensure that our results are robust for both brands, we separate our data into the Coach 
subsample and the LV subsample, and run the analysis for each subsample respectively. The 
results of hypotheses testing qualitatively hold for both brands. The market feature, 
POPULARITY, and the product features, NEWARRIVAL and AVAILABILITY, however, do 
not affect price dispersion significantly in either equation. 
 
Robustness Tests 
 
To examine the robustness of our findings, we conduct several additional tests. Sellers in the 
microbusiness market are heterogeneous in multiple dimensions in addition to reputation. We 
therefore conduct two robustness tests to control seller heterogeneity in other dimensions. In the 
first robustness test, we add a variable, DISPERSIONST, to control seller heterogeneity in tenure 
(see Appendix, Table A2 for the results). In the second robustness test, we add another variable 
DISPERSIONTQ to control seller heterogeneity in selling volume in addition to 
DISPERSIONST (see Appendix, Table A3 for the results). Our results for all hypotheses still 
hold qualitatively. Interestingly, DISPERSIONST and DISPERSIONTQ are positively 
associated with the dispersion of transaction prices but do not affect the dispersion of listing 
prices, which is in stark contrast to the impacts of seller reputation heterogeneity. These findings 
suggest that longer seller tenure and higher transaction volume do not help sellers to differentiate 
themselves from others and to charge a higher price premium. On the demand side, buyers care 
less about the seller experience and transaction history and buy from sellers that vary 
dramatically on these two dimensions. We also use a trend variable, MONTH, varying from 1 to 
8 (i.e., replacing the time dummy variables) to control for any possible seasonality effects during 
the year. We find that all the results of our hypotheses hold qualitatively (see Appendix, Table 
A4). 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Our research reveals two important differences between the dispersion of transaction prices and 
the dispersion of listing prices. The first is that the magnitude of price dispersion measured by 
transaction prices is much lower than that measured by listing prices. In particular, the dispersion 
of transaction prices is only 20 percent (based on PD) or 25 percent (based on CV) of the 
dispersion of listing prices in the same market. This difference is largely due to the fact that in 
the market some listing prices have never been fulfilled, which suggests that some sellers may 
not have rational expectations about consumer behavior when setting prices. Our result is 
consistent with Ghose and Yao’s [27] observation in an online business-to-business market. It is 
worth noting that the research contexts in this paper differ from those in Ghose and Yao’s paper 
[27]. Ghose and Yao[27] study a heavily regulated government procurement e-market, where 
vendors’ reputation does not play a major role and buyers’ search costs are low. In our research, 
sellers’ reputation scores vary in a wide range and buyers have to search intensively when 
purchasing high-involvement products. Nevertheless, both papers find that the dispersion of 
transaction prices is very low, suggesting that the “law of one price” is likely to happen on the 
demand side of the market. In the Internet age, consumers are well-informed due to abundant 
information online. Electronic word of mouth and convenient search tools help consumers to 
discover the price that they need to pay for a product [35, 58]. Consequently, transaction prices 
are more likely to converge, even though the variation of listing prices from different sellers is 
still large. 
 
The second distinction is that the drivers of price dispersion are very different between the two 
sides of the market. This important phenomenon has never been explicitly studied and explained 
in prior literature. Transaction prices reflect consumers’ purchase decisions whereas listing 
prices represent sellers’ pricing decisions. This study shows that information asymmetry exists 
between the two sides of the microbusiness market. 
 
Sellers, especially microbusiness owners, may not fully understand consumer behavior when 
they set prices. In this study, consumers are bargain hunters who, to save money, choose to buy 
luxury handbags from an unauthorized online channel instead of from official retail stores. They 
engage in more intensive search for more expensive items, hoping to save more [71]. In addition, 
some higher-end luxury handbags cost more than $1,000, a sixth of an average Chinese gross 
annual income (www.worldbank.org/en/country/china/overview). Consumers are more cautious 
when making purchase decisions for these high-end handbags. Therefore, transaction prices are 
more converged for more expensive handbag styles. However, the results of this study show that 
sellers’ pricing decisions on Taobao.com are not significantly affected by official price levels, 
which suggests that these sellers may not necessarily understand buyers’ expectations and 
behavior. The owner-managers of microbusinesses tend to use informally absorbed information 
rather than formal business plans in their decision making [29]. These sellers may not have 
sufficient analytical capabilities to gain insights into consumer behavior, and hence they end up 
choosing satisfying rather than profit-maximizing strategies [30]. If sellers are large enterprises, 
we expect the disparities between the two sides of the market to be smaller. 
 
Our empirical findings highlight two opposite impacts of market concentration on price 
dispersion. It can reduce price dispersion via intensified market competition, but it can also 
increase price dispersion because of higher consumer search costs. On the demand side, 
consumers engage in intensive search for luxury handbags in the online market. When there are 
more sellers, consumers need to investigate more information, such as sellers’ reputation scores, 
detailed product descriptions, and buyers’ comments on prior transactions. Thus, for consumers, 
the search cost effect associated with the number of sellers dominates the competition effect, and 
transaction prices diverge more when there are more sellers in the market. However, sellers are 
more concerned about the competition effect compared with buyers. Sellers are the ones that 
directly face market competition from their rivals, and the competition effect has a stronger 
impact on sellers than on buyers. From sellers’ perspective, when there are more rivals offering 
the same products in the market, the competitive pressure in the market cancels out the flexibility 
to set prices differently due to more costly search. Thus, the number of sellers does not 
significantly affect the dispersion of listing prices. 
 
Another interesting finding is that seller reputation heterogeneity affects the dispersion of listing 
prices but not necessarily the dispersion of transaction prices. Seller trustworthiness has long 
been considered valuable in online markets, and seller reputation is the most important factor 
affecting online seller choice [63]. Our results confirm that reputation is a key factor when sellers 
make their pricing decisions. However, on the demand side, it is surprising that seller reputation 
heterogeneity does not affect the dispersion of transactions prices. It is worth noting that this 
result does not mean that seller reputation does not matter for buyers. Buyers take seller 
reputation scores into consideration and tend to patronize reputable sellers. For example, Figure 
2 indicates that consumers rarely buy luxury handbags from sellers who have reputation scores 
lower than 1,000 points. As a result, the variation in sellers’ reputation scores is relatively low 
for successful transactions compared with that of all sellers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of seller ratings between listing prices and transaction prices for Coach 
handbag style 17937 
 
Some limitations must be acknowledged when interpreting the results of this study. In this 
research, price variation appears on both sides of the market. In industries where listing prices 
are determined or tightly controlled by manufacturers (e.g., the manufacturer’s suggested retail 
price), price dispersion can only occur on the demand side and this makes our findings no longer 
applicable. Another limitation is that we investigate only a single product category due to data 
availability. The data collection process was computationally expensive and time consuming, 
which prevented us from collecting more data from broader product categories. Future research 
can explore the difference between the dispersion of listing prices and the dispersion of 
transaction prices in other product categories, and in other types of online markets. Some buyer-
related factors, such as buyer heterogeneity, might also affect price dispersion differently 
between the two sides of the market. However, such variables are not observable in this study. 
Future research can examine and compare the impacts of the buyer-related factors on price 
dispersion on both sides of the market. Finally, this study focuses on the market-level dispersion 
of prices. A possible extension of this work would be to investigate individual sellers’ entry and 
pricing decisions and buyers’ purchase decisions in order to gain an in-depth understanding of 
online market dynamics. 
 
 
 
Table A1. Pooled Dispersion of Listing Price and Transaction Price Together 
 
Table A2. DISPERSIONST Added to Control Seller Heterogeneity in Experience 
 
 
Table A3. DISPERSIONST and DISPERSIONTQ Added to Control Seller Heterogeneity in 
Experience and Transaction Quantity 
 
 
 
Table A4. Use of a Trend Variable (MONTH) Varying from 1 to 8 
 
Notes 
 
1. Both Taobao Marketplace and Tmall are operated in China by Alibaba Group. Tmall.com 
was separated from Taobao in 2011 and becomes a business-to-consumer platform for 
brand owners and authorized distributors. 
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